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Abstract 5 
International trade in wildlife is a complex multi-billion dollar industry. To supply it, 6 
many animals are extracted from the wild, sourced from biodiversity-rich, developing 7 
countries. Whilst the trade has far-reaching implications for wildlife protection, there is 8 
limited information regarding the socio-economic implications in supply countries. 9 
Consequently, a better understanding of the costs and benefits of wildlife supply 10 
chains, for both livelihoods and conservation, is required to enhance wildlife trade 11 
management and inform its regulation. Using Madagascar as a case study, we used 12 
value chain analysis to explore the operation of legal wildlife trade on a national scale; 13 
we estimate the number of actors involved, the scale, value and profit distribution 14 
along the chain, and explore management options. We find that the supply of wildlife 15 
provided economic benefits to a number of actors, from local collectors, to 16 
intermediaries, exporters and national authorities. CITES-listed reptiles and 17 
amphibians comprised a substantial proportion of the quantity and value of live animal 18 
exports with a total minimum export value of 230,795USD per year. Sales prices of 19 
reptiles and amphibians increased over 100-fold between local collectors and 20 
exporters, with exporters capturing ~92% of final export price (or 57% when their 21 
costs are deducted). However, exporters shouldered the largest costs and financial 22 
risks. Local collectors obtained ~1.4% of the final sales price, and opportunities for 23 
poverty alleviation and incentives for sustainable management from the trade appear to 24 
be limited. Promoting collective management of species harvests at the local level may 25 
enhance conservation and livelihood benefits. However, this approach requires 26 
consideration of property rights and land-tenure systems. The complex and informal 27 
nature of some wildlife supply chains make the design and implementation of policy 28 
instruments aimed at enhancing conservation and livelihoods challenging. 29 
Nevertheless, value chain analysis provides a mechanism by which management 30 
actions can be more precisely targeted.   31 
  
1. Introduction 32 
The scale of the legal and illegal global trade in wildlife is vast, with legal trade alone 33 
estimated to be worth 323 billion USD each year (TRAFFIC 2008). To supply this 34 
trade, fauna and flora are often extracted from the wild, frequently from biodiversity-35 
rich countries experiencing high levels of poverty. Consequently, wildlife trade has 36 
implications for biodiversity conservation (Kenney et al. 1995; Garcia-Diaz et al. 37 
2015), human and environmental health (Karesh et al. 2005; Smith et al. 2009), and 38 
human development and society (Roe 2002, 2008, Duffy 2014). To enhance its 39 
management, improved understanding of the costs and benefits of wildlife trade supply 40 
chains are required. However, this is a multifaceted and complex task. For example, 41 
the dependency of people on forests and their products such as medicinal plants, wild 42 
meat, live animals, fungi and nuts, goes far beyond village boundaries, contributing to 43 
rural, urban, migrant and resident livelihoods, as well as national and global economies 44 
(Ambrose-Oji 2003; Jensen 2009; Roe et al. 2009). Therefore, threats to species and 45 
habitats are driven by economic activity and consumer demand locally and globally by 46 
economic actors far removed from the place of origin (Lenzen et al. 2012). 47 
Additionally, as well as providing livelihood benefits to local people; economic, 48 
cultural or spiritual benefits obtained by those engaged in wildlife trade may, or may 49 
not, provide incentives for conservation and sustainable management of natural 50 
resources at the local level (Hutton & Leader-Williams 2003; Jones et al. 2008; 51 
Robinson et al. 2018). In general, for trade to generate incentives for conservation, 52 
both adequate benefits, and favourable governance conditions including long-term, 53 
secure property rights, are required (Bulte et al. 2003). In addition, a number of 54 
combined factors come into play, including ‘species-level’ factors such as suitability 55 
for harvest (e.g. resilience, accessibility); wider ‘governance’ factors including policy 56 
settings; ‘supply chain’ factors including organisation and operation of the supply 57 
chain (e.g. barriers to entry, length of the chain); and ‘end-market’ factors, including 58 
market size, demand elasticity and consumer preferences (Cooney et al. 2015), all of 59 
which will vary considerably on a case-by-case basis. 60 
 Within conservation science, there is a need for research to adopt interdisciplinary 61 
approaches to address socio-ecological challenges (Mascia et al. 2003; Milner-Gulland 62 
2012). This is particularly important when considering wildlife trade, where an 63 
understanding of the ecological consequences of trade alone would fail to illuminate 64 
the economic and social benefits associated with ongoing business. Therefore, an 65 
understanding of socio-economic factors, including markets, is paramount. One 66 
method for understanding trade-chains is the value chain approach (VCA). The VCA is 67 
a descriptive tool and analytical instrument used to understand not only the structure, 68 
operation and profit distribution through the trade chain, but also to identify entry 69 
points for policy initiatives and value addition. It incorporates the whole range of 70 
activities and relations associated with production, exchange, transport and distribution 71 
of a commodity (Kaplinsky & Morris 2001; Jensen 2009). VCA has been used to 72 
  
examine markets (including financial analyses, competition, governance, entry 73 
barriers, and geographic coverage) and has contributed to the research agenda for 74 
various non-timber forest products (Avocèvou-Ayisso et al. 2009; Jensen 2009) 75 
including charcoal (Shively et al. 2010), wild meat (Boakye et al. 2016; Cowlishaw et 76 
al. 2005), fisheries (Johnson 2010) and python skins (Kasterine et al. 2012). However, 77 
there is limited research applying VCA to commercial trade in live animals.  78 
With increasing globalisation and awareness of the impact of international trade on 79 
biodiversity (Lenzen et al. 2012), initiatives such as certification or labelling schemes 80 
that require producers of goods and services to adhere to environmental and social 81 
welfare production standards have become increasingly popular (Blackman & Rivera 82 
2011). For example, there are an estimated 600 eco-labels worldwide, covering ~15% 83 
of the global trade in bananas, 12% of wild fisheries, 10% of global forestry products 84 
and 7% of global coffee (Eilperin 2010). Whilst much of the trade in live wild animals 85 
does not currently fall under such schemes, there is increasing pressure from 86 
environmental groups and other stakeholders to ban the trade on the grounds of 87 
welfare, biodiversity loss, health and/or moral considerations (Check 2004; Huyton 88 
2015). The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 89 
and Flora (CITES) provides some means of assurance regarding ecological 90 
sustainability of wildlife trade, through its requirement for trading countries to 91 
determine that exports of listed-species will not be detrimental to their populations in 92 
the wild (a ‘non-detriment finding’). However, not all species are listed by CITES, and 93 
there is limited information available regarding wider implications of the trade on 94 
livelihoods and economies in supply countries. Therefore, debates concerning 95 
regulation of the trade in live animals are often dominated by potential impacts on wild 96 
populations and animal welfare issues, rather than incentives for conservation.  97 
Consequently, there is a need for a thorough understanding of trade chains supplying 98 
such animals, including information on the actors, livelihood benefits, and potential 99 
conservation implications. 100 
To address this data gap, we explore the legal commercial trade in live animals, with 101 
particular emphasis on herpetofauna, in a biodiversity hotspot, Madagascar. 102 
Madagascar has unparalleled levels of biological diversity and endemic species (Myers 103 
et al. 2000) which are threatened by continued habitat degradation, driven by economic 104 
activities, population growth and high human poverty (Harper et al. 2007; Waeber et 105 
al. 2016). Over the last 15 years, Madagascar has emerged as a significant exporter of 106 
reptiles and amphibians to supply trade in exotic pets (Carpenter et al. 2004; 107 
Rabemananjara et al. 2008; Robinson et al. 2015). Whilst legal trade exists for many 108 
species subject to national quotas and CITES regulation, illegal trade, particularly in 109 
high value CITES Appendix I species which are prohibited in commercial trade 110 
(including several of Madagascar’s endemic tortoise species) has proliferated, having a 111 
devastating impact on their wild populations (O'Brien et al. 2003; Walker et al. 2004; 112 
Mbohoahy & Manjoazy 2016). There is insufficient information to understand the 113 
degree of crossover between the legal and illegal herpetofauna trade, although some 114 
consider it unlikely that smuggling of large quantities of low commercial value species 115 
  
occurs (Rabemananjara et al. 2008). Previous studies, conducted over a decade ago, 116 
explored the structure of the trade chain in Madagascar in relation to chameleons 117 
(Carpenter et al. 2004) and mantella frogs (Rabemananjara et al. 2008) and more 118 
recent research has analysed the relative importance of wildlife trade as a livelihood 119 
strategy in rural areas (Robinson et al. 2018). Here we apply VCA to understand the 120 
scale and value of the wildlife trade on a national scale, and the profit distribution and 121 
value along the chain from village to export. We also update information on the current 122 
structure and operation of the wildlife supply chain, and estimate the number of actors 123 
involved. This study expands our understanding of the conservation and socio-124 
economic implications of wildlife trade, and contributes towards discussions 125 
concerning sustainability and management of trade in wildlife in Madagascar, and 126 
more generally. 127 
2. Methods 128 
We carried out semi-structured interviews with a range of stakeholders involved in 129 
wildlife trade in Madagascar between 22nd November 2013 and 8th June 2014. This 130 
included the CITES Management Authority of Madagascar, registered wildlife 131 
exporters, intermediaries and local collectors. Our research focussed on legal wildlife 132 
trade (i.e. trade permitted under CITES and/or national regulations), all questions were 133 
voluntary, and all respondents were made aware of this during the free prior informed 134 
consent process. However, we acknowledge that there may be some cross-over with 135 
illegal markets within the supply chain. 136 
2.1. Sampling 137 
To identify individuals involved at different points along the wildlife trade chain, we 138 
used snowball sampling (Bryman 2015). Initially, we conducted interviews with the 139 
CITES Management Authority who provided a list of registered wildlife exporters. 140 
During interviews, exporters were asked to list names and locations of intermediaries 141 
they worked with in order for us to obtain an estimate of the number of intermediaries, 142 
and approach them for interviews. Subsequently, intermediaries were asked to provide 143 
names and village locations of local collectors. Local collectors were identified 144 
through systematic household sampling in identified villages and snowball sampling, 145 
whereby village leaders, local guides and respondents from the household sample were 146 
asked to identify local reptiles and amphibian collectors (Robinson et al. 2018). 147 
2.2. Semi-structured interviews 148 
Interviews with exporters, intermediaries and local collectors covered several topics 149 
including: demographics (age, education etc.); livelihood information relating to 150 
wildlife trade (time in job, working hours, income, costs, other livelihood activities); 151 
wildlife groups traded and species sale/purchase prices; structure and operation of the 152 
supply chain (suppliers used, procedures followed, specific instructions 153 
received/provided, questions relating to supply/demand, collection practices); 154 
  
legislation and quotas. Additionally, we asked exporters about their facilities (location, 155 
date established, number of employees, job types, revenue, costs). To understand profit 156 
distribution across the supply chain, we asked each respondent along the chain 157 
(exporters, intermediaries, local collectors) to provide purchase and sale prices of 24 158 
pre-selected reptile and amphibian species known to be traded. This was facilitated 159 
using Latin, English and Malagasy names of species and photographs. Where no new 160 
relevant information was emerging for particular questions, i.e. saturation had been 161 
achieved (Bryman 2012), particular lines of questioning were dropped or adapted. 162 
Therefore not all respondents were asked all questions. Triangulation was used to 163 
verify information received from different actor groups; for example, both exporters 164 
and intermediaries were asked the prices animals were exchanged for. 165 
Interviews were carried out in English or in Malagasy/French and interpreted by two of 166 
the authors. Exporter and intermediary interviews were recorded for verification if 167 
respondents granted permission. Consent was recorded by means of a tick box on the 168 
data form. Ethical approval was received from the University of Kent. 169 
2.3. Data request 170 
To determine the extent of the trade, data were requested from the General Director of 171 
Forests, Ministry of Environment, Ecology and Forests (CITES Management 172 
Authority of Madagascar) on the volume of animals and plants belonging to different 173 
species exported from Madagascar in 2013; the individual value declared by exporters 174 
for individual species; and the total value of wildlife exports. Price information was 175 
converted into US dollars (USD) based on an exchange rate of 1USD=2283.11 176 
Malagasy Ariary (MGA) valid at the time of the study (29.01.2014) 177 
(www.coinmill.com). 178 
2.4. Data analysis 179 
Prices declared by exporters to the authorities (from data request) were compared with 180 
price information provided in person during exporter interviews using a non-181 
parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test. As data were not normally distributed we 182 
calculated median prices for each of the 24 pre-selected species at each stage of the 183 
chain across respondents, resulting in median purchase and sales prices for each 184 
species from exporters and intermediaries, and median sales prices declared by local 185 
collectors. Prices provided by different actor groups were compared using a Wilcoxon 186 
Signed-Rank Test. We then calculated the mean price across all 24 species and used 187 
this value to calculate the mark-up of prices along the chain, marketing margins 188 
(proportion of final sales price captured by different actor groups), and the value of the 189 
herpetofauna trade to different actor groups.   190 
We estimated marketing margins of actor groups following Cowlishaw et al. (2005) 191 
and Avocèvou-Ayisso et al. (2009). This was calculated as (Ps – Pp)/Pf where Ps is the 192 
mean sales price, Pp is the mean purchase price (i.e. the sales price reported by the 193 
previous actor in the chain) and Pf is the final sales price at the end of the chain (at 194 
  
export). We then adjusted this figure to allow for estimated costs (transport, equipment 195 
etc.) using (Ps-Pp-Pc)/Pf-ƩPc where Pc is the estimated costs incurred by the actor 196 
group. Marketing margins were also calculated for each of the 24 species individually, 197 
and Spearman’s Rank correlations used to test for relationships between species value 198 
and marketing margins received by different actor groups to explore if respondents 199 
received a greater share of export value for more valuable species.  200 
To calculate the potential value of the reptile and amphibian trade to different actor 201 
groups along the chain, we calculated the proportion of the final export value declared 202 
by exporters (provided in data request) that reached different actor groups. To do this 203 
we used the mean sale and purchase price provided by respondents (across the 24 204 
species) to calculate the proportion of the sales price comprised of the cost of 205 
purchasing animals from the previous actor in the chain. This represented the value 206 
being passed to the previous actor group. We then incorporated additional cost 207 
information based on expenses (equipment, transport, etc.) into the calculations, 208 
adjusting the profit received by each actor group accordingly. Based on this, we 209 
estimated the proportion of the final declared export value that was made up of profit 210 
and costs for each group. Since we obtained price data from multiple sources (for 211 
comparison and triangulation), we conducted a sensitivity analysis to incorporate the 212 
variation in prices given by different actor groups. For example, exporters told us the 213 
prices they paid to purchase animals from intermediaries, and intermediaries told us 214 
prices they charged to exporters. Therefore, the proportion of the final export value 215 
made up of exporter’s purchase costs could be calculated in two ways; from the 216 
exporter-declared mean sale price divided by exporter-declared mean purchase price, 217 
or from the exporter-declared mean sales price divided by the intermediary-declared 218 
mean sales price. Therefore, we report the minimum and maximum potential values. 219 
3. Results 220 
3.1. Scale and value of wildlife trade from Madagascar 221 
Data provided by the CITES Management Authority indicated that the live trade in 222 
wildlife from Madagascar, including both flora and fauna was worth 346,249USD in 223 
2013. Reptiles and amphibians (CITES and non-CITES) accounted for 66.7% of this 224 
total, with CITES reptiles accounting for a considerable proportion (50.4%) of total 225 
wildlife export income (Figure 1a). The 2013 Ministry records show the total declared 226 
export value of reptiles and amphibians from Madagascar amounted to 230,795USD, 227 
generating 14,621USD in taxes to the Ministry of Environment and Forests. However, 228 
the mean sales price provided by exporters during our interviews was 2.8 times higher 229 
than declared export prices (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Z=-4.29, n=24, p<0.001, 230 
Supporting Information, Table S.4.8.1). Therefore, based on the proportional 231 
difference, the total export value of reptiles and amphibians for 2013 may total 232 
646,226USD. 233 
CITES reptiles and amphibians comprised 87.9% of the trade in all animals in terms of 234 
numbers of individuals (Figure 1b). A total of 31,871 reptiles and amphibians were 235 
  
exported from Madagascar during the calendar year 2013 (including CITES and non-236 
CITES species).  237 
3.2. Structure and operation of the supply chain 238 
The wildlife supply chain comprised registered exporters, local collectors who trapped 239 
animals in the wild and intermediaries who brought animals from local collection areas 240 
to export facilities (Figure 2). In some cases, however, the distinction between actors 241 
was not clear. For example, the role of local collectors and intermediaries sometimes 242 
overlapped, and exporters occasionally by-passed intermediaries to obtain animals 243 
directly from local collectors, sent their own staff to collection areas, or supplied other 244 
exporters (particularly when exporters were located in different parts of the country). 245 
We conducted in-depth interviews with eight of the 11 wildlife exporters (72.7% of 246 
exporters), 12 intermediaries and 28 local collectors of reptiles and amphibians. In 247 
total, 48 actors were interviewed. 248 
Animal exporters were mainly situated in or around the capital Antananarivo, with one 249 
in Toamasina (East) and one in Toliara (South). Exporters estimated there were 250 
between 20 and 30 intermediaries in Madagascar, but provided 32 different names 251 
between them. However, over the course of the study (asking exporters and other 252 
actors in the chain to identify intermediaries) we were given a total of 39 names. 253 
Intermediaries were identified in several locations including (amongst others) 254 
Moramanga (6), Tulear (6), Tamatave (3), Fort Dauphin (2), Diego Suarez (3), Nosy 255 
Be (1), Antananarivo (2), Mahajanga (1) and Sambava (2).  256 
Fifty-seven percent (n=4) of exporters had other jobs often including additional 257 
businesses, and they employed between one and 13 people (median=6, IQR=3.75, 258 
n=8), sometimes in part-time seasonal jobs (e.g. guards, feeding animals, packing, 259 
transport to airport and general assistance). Most intermediaries (82%, n=9) also had 260 
other jobs (e.g. agriculture, minibus driver, shop, mechanic) and generally worked 261 
alone with occasional help from family and friends to conduct tasks such as counting 262 
animals. Local collectors engaged in wildlife collection as part of a diverse livelihood 263 
portfolio and occasionally engaged family members or others to help. All respondents 264 
had been engaged in the trade long-term (exporters: median=20 years, IQR=10, n=8; 265 
intermediaries median=22 years, IQR=8.3, n=12 and local collectors median=17 years, 266 
IQR=16, n=17). 267 
Animal export usually occurred from September to July (exporter interviews: 268 
median=6.6 months a year, IQR=2, n=7). At the time of research one exporter 269 
interviewed had temporarily stopped exporting reptiles and amphibians, the other 270 
seven exported reptiles and amphibians and other animals such as mammals (n=6, 271 
tenrecs in all cases), invertebrates (n=4), birds (n=4, e.g. Agapornis canus), fish (n=2), 272 
plants (n=2) and cultivated and non-CITES coral (n=1). In all cases, respondents 273 
reported that animals were exported live (as opposed to skins or other products), and 274 
mainly supplied wholesalers, pet shops and specialised reptile outlets around the 275 
  
world. Ministry data indicates that the USA, Japan and Canada were the most 276 
significant importers in terms of volume (no. animals imported), importing 45%, 13% 277 
and 9% respectively of Malagasy herpetofauna in 2013. 278 
Informal verbal contracts existed between different actor groups in the chain, and 279 
intermediaries were required to carry a collection mandate obtained from the exporter 280 
(in turn obtained from the Management Authority) detailing the order specifics. In 281 
almost all cases animals were collected to order, with specific information on 282 
number/species/sex transferred down the chain from exporter to local collector, only 283 
occasionally were animals collected opportunistically. When local collectors were 284 
asked: ‘if you were to collect more animals, how likely is it that you could sell them’, 285 
the majority (82%, n=23) said ‘unlikely’. When asked ‘if you were paid more for each 286 
animal, how would it influence the number you collect’, the majority (86%, n=24) 287 
stated that they would collect the same quantity with most commenting that they stick 288 
to the number ordered because ‘no-one will buy extra animals’, or, if someone would 289 
buy them, it would be for a much lower price. All nine intermediaries corroborated this 290 
stating it was ‘very unlikely’ that if they themselves requested more animals they 291 
would find a buyer.  292 
Exporters were permitted by authorities to collect 10% above quotas to allow for 293 
mortality, but this was not perceived economically viable for all species, depending on 294 
how robust they were. Exporters kept animals for three days to one month prior to 295 
export (median=7, IQR=2.5), and gave intermediaries between two days and one 296 
month to supply animals (median=15 days, IQR=10.5). One exporter commented that 297 
‘it’s not in our interest to keep them in the facility as it says ‘W’ (wild) on [CITES] 298 
application and the animals may lose health if kept’. Local collectors reported it took 299 
between one and 15 days to collect and supply animals to the intermediary 300 
(median=2.5, n=24). Therefore, the total time from collection to export was between a 301 
few days and two months. 302 
3.3. Economics of the supply chain 303 
3.3.1. Comparison of price information provided by actor groups 304 
Purchase prices for 24 species provided by exporters were slightly higher (mean 305 
proportional difference=1.2±0.11, n=23 taxa) than equivalent sale prices provided by 306 
intermediaries, but there was no significant difference (Wilcoxon Signed Rank Z=1.15, 307 
p=0.249). However, there was a significant difference between purchase prices 308 
provided by intermediaries and equivalent sale prices provided by local collectors 309 
(Z=3.88, p<0.001), with prices declared by intermediaries more than double sale prices 310 
declared by local collectors (mean proportional difference=2.5±0.73, n=20 taxa, 311 
supporting Information, Table S2).  312 
3.3.2. Summary of costs encountered by actor groups 313 
Exporters had considerably higher costs than other actor groups along the chain (Table 314 
1). These costs included facility setup and maintenance (e.g. land,  staff, utility bills), 315 
  
transport, packing, agent/broker, collection permit (one-time fee each year), price of 316 
animals, collection fees (paid to local branch of the Ministry; set price of 80 MGA 317 
(0.04USD) per reptile and 30 MGA (0.01USD) per amphibian), informal fees to 318 
communities (varies), and various taxes. Taxes included an export tax for wild animals 319 
to the Ministry (4% of shipment value), voluntary fees to support the CITES Scientific 320 
Authority (2%), taxes to the Ministry of Commerce, veterinary certificate fees (2%), 321 
fees to GasyNet (private company that deals with import/export at airport, one exporter 322 
quoted this as 2% of total invoice per shipment). According to detailed price 323 
information provided by one exporter, costs comprised 35% of revenue generated from 324 
shipments (Table 1). Another exporter corroborated this estimating that costs 325 
comprised 30-50% of final shipment value. 326 
Compared to exporters, local collectors and intermediaries declared minimal costs. 327 
Exporters usually covered intermediaries’ costs of transport, accommodation, 328 
equipment, in addition to the agreed price for animals. Some intermediaries stated they 329 
paid for materials such as cages, plastic bottles, cloth bags, torches and other sundries, 330 
and informal fees to communities. Local collectors’ main costs included torches, 331 
batteries, food and coffee, medicines, and in some cases, items for transporting animals 332 
(baskets, sacks, cloth bags, bottles, and gloves). 333 
3.3.3. Price mark-up across supply chain and marketing margin 334 
Based on sale price information provided by each actor group (Supporting 335 
Information, Table S2), animals were sold by intermediaries for around seven times 336 
the price they were purchased for from local collectors (mean proportional 337 
difference=7.3±1.32; n=19 species). The intermediary sales price increased a further 338 
15 times by exporters prior to sale/export (mean proportional difference=14.98±1.8, 339 
n=23 species). The sale price increased by 105 times (mean proportional 340 
difference=105.28±21.2, n=20 taxa) from local collector to exporter.  341 
Marketing margin (at export) captured by each actor group was greatest for exporters 342 
(92.3%), followed by intermediaries (6.2%) and then local collectors (1.4%) (Table 2). 343 
Consideration of costs reduced the share captured by exporters to 88.5%, and increased 344 
the share captured by intermediaries (9.5%) and local collectors (2.0%) (Table 2). 345 
When calculated for individual species, marketing margins varied between 0.2 and 346 
4.0% for local collectors, 2.8 to 31.3% for intermediaries and 67.0 to 97.3% for 347 
exporters (Supporting Information, Table S3). There was no significant relationship 348 
between final sales prices at export and marketing margins received by local collectors 349 
(rs=-0.095, n=20, p=0.690), intermediaries (rs=-0.371, n=23, p=0.082) or exporters 350 
(rs=0.335, n=23, p=0.118), suggesting the share received by actors was not related to 351 
the export value of the species.  352 
Exporters estimated that ~35% of  shipment value was used on expenses, therefore 353 
based on a final declared export value of 230,795USD logged with the Ministry for all 354 
exporters in 2013, this represents a profit of 149,324USD (Figure 3). According to the 355 
  
sensitivity analysis, we estimated that purchase prices paid by exporters for animals 356 
comprised 7.7 to 9.3% of prices they sold them for, representing a transmission of 357 
17,708 to 21,511USD to intermediaries. Incorporating animal purchase costs paid by 358 
intermediaries (ranging from 15.5 to 47.7% of sales prices) and additional costs 359 
(0.18%, Table 1), estimates for profit received by intermediaries ranged from 9,238 to 360 
18,144USD. Local collectors did not encounter costs of purchasing animals but based 361 
on estimated additional costs (10.6%, Table 1), this resulted in an estimate of 2,449 to 362 
9,163USD reaching local collectors (Figure 3). However, based on the discrepancy in 363 
prices between declared export values reported in Ministry data, and the prices 364 
exporters reported during the interviews, these values may be considerably higher. For 365 
example, based on a cumulative export value of 646,226USD (sales prices reported by 366 
exporters being 2.8-times higher than prices reported to Ministry), exporters could 367 
receive a profit of 418,108USD; intermediaries from 25,866 to 50,804USD and local 368 
collectors from 6,857 to 25,658USD. 369 
4. Discussion 370 
The export of live (particularly CITES-listed) reptiles and amphibians from 371 
Madagascar clearly forms a significant component of the country’s wildlife trade in 372 
terms of both number of individual animals, and value. Analysis of the supply chain 373 
reveals the extent and distribution of economic benefits obtained by different actors 374 
along the chain. These benefits extend beyond local collection areas, to intermediaries 375 
in urban areas, export businesses and their employees, to local authorities and the 376 
national economy.  377 
There has been a reduction in the number of animal exporters from 13 (1996-1999, 378 
Carpenter et al. 2005) and 17 (2003-2004, Rabemananjara et al. 2008), to 10 active 379 
exporters in the current study. Additionally, whilst in 2003-2004 intermediaries were 380 
described as ‘solely involved in the wildlife trade’ and ‘for most exporters, animal and 381 
plant export is the main source of income’ (Rabemananjara et al. 2008) we found few 382 
people involved as their sole occupation. The flexibility of the chain, particularly the 383 
overlapping roles of intermediaries and local collectors, may explain discrepancies in 384 
price information received from different actors. For example, a local collector 385 
subcontracted by another local collector to fulfil an order may only receive half the 386 
price that the contractor receives. Other factors such as village location or collecting 387 
site may also influence prices. Price differences between those exporters provided 388 
during interviews and those declared to the Ministry may be explained by under-389 
declaration of prices to the Ministry, exaggeration of prices during interviews, price 390 
increases since the data request, or general variation in the data. 391 
The trade consisted of well-established actors, as individuals all along the chain had 392 
mostly been in the business for long periods (~20 years). Importantly, the trade 393 
operated on the basis of informal verbal contracts between actors, based on trust. 394 
Therefore, knowledge of the supply chain participants, contacts and reputation were 395 
particularly important in coordinating activities within the chain. Animals were rarely 396 
  
collected opportunistically, as was sometimes the case in the past (Carpenter et al. 397 
2005), but were collected to order, with specific details (e.g. species/sex/quantity) 398 
passed down the chain from exporters to local collectors. In the majority of cases, it 399 
was not considered economic to collect opportunistically as buyers were not available, 400 
or would pay a lower price. Only occasionally, if a desirable, evasive, or valuable 401 
specimen was encountered opportunistically, would they collect that animal. Once 402 
collected, animals were not kept in-country for long, thus minimising exporter costs. 403 
Although we did not verify health of animals in trade, with payments frequently 404 
phased (50% before and 50% on delivery), and often with no payment for poor quality 405 
animals, there are incentives for suppliers to deliver animals in good condition.  406 
Whilst exporters captured by far the largest proportion of the final sales price, they also 407 
incurred the largest proportion of costs associated with running and licencing their 408 
facilities and infrastructures. There is also risk associated with export of live 409 
herpetofauna. For example, exporters must factor in mortality of animals in transit, for 410 
which they may not get paid. Comparably, intermediaries and local collectors had 411 
minimal costs and therefore much lower investment. However, even when taking into 412 
account the estimated costs exporters’ face, the proportion of final sales price received 413 
by local collectors is relatively low (1.3-2.0%). Recent comparable examples are 414 
scarce, but caiman hunters in Louisiana received 5-15% of export price (Moyle 2013); 415 
chameleons collectors in Tanzania received ~8.3% (Roe 2002); parrots collectors in 416 
Indonesia received 5.2% (Swanson 1992), and ornamental fish collectors in Brazil 417 
received 10%-19%  (Baquero 1999, Watson & Roberts 2015). Carpenter et al. (2005) 418 
noted that local collectors and intermediaries in Madagascar suffered 419 
disproportionately greater price reductions than exporters following trade restrictions, 420 
in particular the Experimental Management Program (EMP) implemented in 1999. The 421 
EMP was a national initiative, in compliance with exporters, to address CITES 422 
concerns. It initially restricted trade, with the aim of increasing the number of species 423 
permitted based on good management, but was essentially dominated by a cartel of 424 
powerful exporters and resulted in a ~100-fold differential between prices paid to 425 
exporters and local collectors (Carpenter et al. 2005). This price differential still 426 
appears to be the case today despite the collapse of the EMP.  427 
This research describes the economic benefits received by actors along the entire 428 
herpetofauna supply chain in Madagascar, and demonstrates that a large proportion of 429 
the benefits are obtained by exporters. However, income obtained is not 430 
straightforward to interpret. For example, a small amount of money will go further 431 
amongst local collectors, compared with intermediaries and exporters residing in towns 432 
and cities, and local collectors in rural communities may be more in need of 433 
employment no matter how small the financial benefits. Recent research in the same 434 
study area (Robinson et al. 2018) revealed that 13% of households in collection areas 435 
benefitted from local harvest of live animals for export (including some of the poorest) 436 
and it was potentially profitable. However, it also revealed the unreliable and sporadic 437 
nature of live animal collection (limited by quotas, season, opportunity cost and 438 
supply), and that incentives appear insufficient to promote conservation of species and 439 
  
habitats (Robinson et al. 2018). Equally, in their study of mantella frog trade in 440 
Madagascar, Rabemananjara (2008) observed that because collection permits are 441 
issued to exporters rather than local collectors - and collectors are paid low prices - the 442 
system becomes counterproductive in terms of promoting sustainable harvesting and 443 
incentives to conserve resources based on benefits received. The fact that local 444 
collectors are not in possession of permits, may promote a sense of insecurity and 445 
disconnect from regulatory processes (e.g. collectors have to trust the word of the 446 
middleman, and may have insufficient knowledge regarding measures such as quotas). 447 
In order for the trade to provide incentives to motivate pro-conservation behaviours, 448 
not only should benefits be adequate, but property rights also need to be sufficient so 449 
that local stakeholders are in a position to manage their own resources (Cooney et al. 450 
2015). However, property rights are often poorly defined in Madagascar (Bojö et al. 451 
2013), meaning that the collector typically does not own the resource from which the 452 
animals are being harvested, so it is unknown whether they can control management of 453 
the resource, or if the social capital exists to do so. Therefore, whilst the trade in 454 
herpetofauna from Madagascar brings some benefits to stakeholders along the chain, at 455 
the local level, both incentives for conservation, and opportunities to alleviate rural 456 
poverty appear to be limited as they currently stand.   457 
4.1. Conclusion and options for sustainable trade 458 
Madagascar is a top global conservation priority (Myers et al. 2000), but with 77.8% 459 
of its population living below the poverty line of $1.90 a day (UNDP, 2018); pressures 460 
on natural resources are high. Habitats are severely threatened by slash and burn 461 
agriculture, cutting fuelwood, charcoal production, cattle raising, mining, bushmeat 462 
and over-harvesting of resources (Cardiff & Andriamanalina 2007, Harper et al. 2007, 463 
Razafimanahaka et al., 2012). Political instability (2009-2014) saw donor funding 464 
suspended and a proliferation of illegal activities, including logging of valuable 465 
hardwoods in protected areas (Innes 2010; Waeber & Wilmé 2013). Despite hundreds 466 
of millions of US dollars invested in environmental projects and an expanded protected 467 
area network, efforts to deliver progress towards poverty reduction and reducing 468 
deforestation rates have failed (Gardener et al. 2018, Waeber et al. 2018). 469 
Consequently, finding solutions where livelihood and conservation benefits can be 470 
reconciled are essential.  471 
Certain high-value (and prohibited) reptile species, such as the ploughshare and 472 
radiated tortoise, are being illegally traded from Madagascar (Mbohoahy & Manjoazy 473 
2016). However, the legal trade in herpetofauna is contributing to some people’s 474 
livelihoods. Given that any move towards further trade restrictions could remove 475 
benefits and undermine management incentives, we concentrate here on exploring 476 
options with potential to enhance both conservation and livelihood benefits utilising 477 
the trade. Certification or labelling schemes aimed at improving ecological and social 478 
sustainability might allow higher prices to be realised at export, with an increase in 479 
benefits passed down the chain. However, certification schemes have large cost and 480 
bureaucratic implications, and whilst receiving limited attention in the pet trade, have 481 
  
been largely unsuccessful for ornamental fish (Vosseler 2015). Equally, it is unknown 482 
whether demand exists for such products amongst end-consumers. Other approaches 483 
may include promoting collective management of the resource amongst local 484 
collectors (e.g. through formation of producer associations), as well as boosting 485 
capacity. This could focus on coordinating collecting activities (e.g. sharing 486 
information on trapping requests, setting prices) and raising awareness of traded 487 
species (e.g. legislation, value, ecology, appropriate collection methods). For example, 488 
the Sustainably Harvested Devil’s Claw project in Namibia, which similarly focussed 489 
on ensuring good prices, strengthening harvester bargaining power and providing 490 
general information and support, demonstrated that improved benefit sharing 491 
contributed to improved resource conservation (Stewart & Cole 2005). However, many 492 
of the villages where wildlife collectors reside are isolated and often difficult to access, 493 
making communication between local collectors difficult. Intermediaries may therefore 494 
have an important role to play within the supply chain in terms of communication 495 
(contacts, accessibility, transport) and could be incorporated into producer focussed 496 
initiatives through professionalization of middlemen networks. Greater consideration 497 
would need to be given to property rights and land tenure systems in Madagascar, to 498 
enable such management to work.Our analysis reveals that almost 32,000 reptiles and 499 
amphibians were legally exported from Madagascar in 2013, with an estimated export 500 
value of between 231,000 and 646,000USD. Local collectors obtain ~1.4% of the final 501 
sales price, and opportunities for poverty alleviation and incentives for sustainable 502 
management from the trade, appear to be limited. We also reveal the complex and 503 
informal nature of wildlife trade supply chains, and illustrate the challenges faced by 504 
practitioners attempting to enhance the trade for both livelihoods and conservation. In 505 
addition to improving understanding of the costs and benefits of the wildlife trade to 506 
different actor groups, we demonstrate the utility of value chain analysis in providing a 507 
mechanism by which management strategies to regulate wildlife trade can be more 508 
precisely targeted. 509 
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Figure 1 (a) Value in USD of wildlife exports (including both flora and fauna) from 
Madagascar in 2013, as provided by the CITES Management Authority of 
Madagascar. Data were missing for non-CITES palms, shells, and Apanga (Pteridium 
aquilinum). Additionally, whilst data were provided for ‘other succulents: finished 
goods’ they were missing for ‘other succulents: tubes’ and ‘other succulents: number’. 
Data were converted from Malagasy Ariary (MGA) to US dollars (USD) based on an 
exchange rate of 1USD=2283.11 MGA valid 29/01/2014 (www.coinmill.com). (b) 
Quantity of live fauna exported from Madagascar in 2013, as provided by the CITES 
Management Authority of Madagascar. Flora are excluded from this figure as some are 
exported by weight (e.g. kilograms of seed) rather than as whole plants and are 
therefore not directly comparable. No data were provided for non-CITES mammals or 
birds and we have been unable to verify whether this is because there is no trade in 
these groups or just no data. 
  
 
 
Figure 2 Structure of the wildlife trade supply chain in Madagascar and approximate 
numbers of people belonging to different actor groups. The supply chain comprised 
local collectors who trapped animals in the wild, intermediaries who brought animals 
from local collection areas to export facilities and registered wildlife exporters.  
*5.4% of randomly selected households in trapping villages in the Moramanga district of 
Madagascar trapped reptiles and amphibians for trade (See Robinson et al. 2018).  
Local collector Intermediary
Intermediary
Exporter
11 registered exporters
+ 49 employees 
~39 intermediaries (minimum)~ 5% of households 
(Moramanga district)*
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Figure 3. Minimum and maximum estimated profit and costs received by local collectors, 
intermediaries and exporters engaged in the commercial reptile and amphibian trade in 
Madagascar. Mean sales price per individual is estimated across 24 different traded species 
are displayed below the x axis. Individual sales prices for each of the 24 species are provided 
in Supporting Information, Table S2.  
  
  
Table 1. Median income and cost information provided by exporters, intermediaries and local 
collectors during interviews for the 2012-2013 collection season (~September to July). 
Percentage costs were calculated based on median revenue and median cost information 
across respondents, with the exception of exporters (because only one exporter gave a 
monetary value for costs, the percentage cost was calculated from that individuals declared 
revenue, rather than the median revenue across all four exporters). IQR=interquartile range. 
  n Median (USD) IQR (USD) % costs 
Exporters net revenue 4 24,381 40,278 - 
Exporter costs 1 13,500  35.3
a 
     
Intermediary income  8 325 1105 - 
Intermediary costs 4 0.66 25 0.18 
     
Local collector income per season 20 114 133 - 
Local collector costs per season 25 12 54 10.6 
aAnother exporter did not give detailed cost information but estimated that 30-50% of the value of one 
shipment will go on expenses.
  
Table 2. Marketing margins of the different actor groups involved in the live reptile and amphibian trade in Madagascar. Marketing margins 
were calculated as (Ps - Pp)/Pf where Ps is the mean sales price, Pp is the mean purchase price (i.e. the sales price reported by the previous actor 
in the chain) and Pf is the final sales price at the end of the chain (at export). We then adjusted this figure to allow for estimated costs (transport, 
equipment etc.) using (Ps-Pp-Pc)/(Pf-ƩPc) where Pc is the estimated costs incurred by the actor group. 
Category of actor Mean selling 
price1 
(USD) 
Costs2 (USD) Local collectors 
marketing margin 
Intermediaries marketing 
margin 
Exporters marketing margin 
  
 Ps/Pf 
(%) 
with costs  
Ps-Pc/  
Pf-ƩPc (%) 
Psi-Pp/ 
Pf (%) 
with costs  
Psi-Pp-Pci/ 
Pf-ƩPc (%) 
Pf-Ppi/ 
Pf (%) 
with costs  
Pf-Ppi-Pcii/  
Pf-ƩPc (%) 
Local collector 0.28 (Ps/Pp) 0.03 (Pc) 1.44 2.00         
Intermediary 1.49 (Psi/Ppi) 0.02 (Pci)   6.23 9.51   
Exporter 19.42 (Pf) 6.86 (Pcii)     92.33 88.48 
1Mean selling price is calculated by taking the median selling price across respondents for each species, and then taking the mean price across the 24 species. 
Selling prices declared by each actor group (exporter, intermediary and local collector) are used. 
2Costs refer to all additional expenses such as transport, packaging etc. but do not include purchase of animals. Values are calculated using the percent costs 
information provided in Table 1. 
